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A TAXONOMY OF DISCRETION: REFINING
THE LEGALITY DEBATE ABOUT OBAMA'S
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION
MICHAEL KAGAN*
On November 21, 2014, President Obama ordered a package of
immigration policy reforms by the Department of Homeland Security and
Department of Justice, including promises of work permits for parents of
children who are U.S. citizens or legal residents.' The November
announcements expanded a program the president announced in 2012,
known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), through
which certain young immigrants may request two-year promises of
deferred action and employment authorization.2 Even before that,
President Obama's Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
John Morton issued memoranda (known as the Morton Memos)
summarizing factors that immigration enforcement officers should use in
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 3
With legislative immigration reform stymied in Congress, broad
executive action has been the Obama administration's signature
contribution to American immigration policy. The centerpiece of Obama's
immigration actions has been expanded use of "deferred action" policies
by which the Department of Homeland Security promises to refrain from
seeking the deportation of certain people and offers them authorization to
seek employment. The Obama administration has also made much more
transparent how it categorizes and prioritizes noncitizens for immigration
enforcement purposes. The result is that many immigrants who are
unlawfully present according to the Immigration and Nationality Act
* Michael Kagan (B.A. Northwestern University, J.D. University of Michigan Law School). The
author is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of
Law. Special thanks to Prof. Christopher J. Walker for helpful suggestions; all errors are mine.
1. Fixing Our Broken Immigration System Through Executive Action-Key Facts, U.S. DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration.
3. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to
agency personnel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June
17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to
agency personnel, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17,
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf
[hereinafter, collectively, Morton Memos].
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(INA) now can secure the opportunity to work legally and receive written
promises that the government has no immediate intention of seeking their
removal.
Since the president had no new Congressional authorization to take
these measures, his actions drew immediate objections from Republican
lawmakers.4 A few lawmakers, joined by at least one prominent
immigration law scholar, have cited the president's actions on immigration
as potential grounds for impeachment.5 Within less than two months of the
president's announcement, two federal district courts had reached opposite
conclusions about whether the president's policies should be ruled
unconstitutional by the judiciary.6 Meanwhile, a coalition of 26 states has
filed a complaint in another federal district court challenging the
president's constitutional authority to implement the new policies and
alleging that the president is acting to unilaterally change or suspend the
law.
Some legal scholars allege that the president's executive actions
indicate a refusal to faithfully execute the law as required by the
Constitution.! By contrast, the White House and a number of immigration
4. See, e.g., Eric Bradner & Jedd Rosche, Republicans Hammer Legal Case Against Obama on
Immigration, CNN.COM (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/l l/20/politics/republican-
response-obama-immigration-speech/; Erin Kelly, Congress Responds to Obama with Bitter Partisan
Split, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/l 1/20/
immigration-executive-action-congressional-reaction-boehner/70031622/.
5. See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, White House Taking Impeachment Seriously, THE HILL (July 25,
2014), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/213329-white-house-gop-might-try-to-impeach; Ahiza
Garcia, GOPer: Impeachment 'a Possibility' if Obama Moves Ahead on Immigration, TALKING
POINTS MEMO (Nov. 10, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/joe-barton-impeach-obama-
immigration; Andrew C. McCarthy, Amnesty and Impeachment, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE (Nov. 8,
2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/392345/amnesty-and-impeachment-andrew-c-mccarthy;
Peter H. Schuck, Why Congress Can Impeach Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ll/22/opinion/the-impeachment-of-obama-on-immigration-may-be-
legal-but-its-wrong.html?P0 (immigration scholar arguing that Obama's actions are illegal); Katie
Zezima, Obama Action on Immigration Should Spark Impeachment Talk, GOP Lawmaker Says,
WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/08/03/
obama-action-on-immigration-should-spark-impeachment-talk-gop-lawmaker-says/.
6. See United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779-797 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (in a case
concerning a criminal conviction, concluding that the Obama policies are unconstitutional). Compare
Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 208 n.12 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2014) (disputing the Juarez-Escobar
decision on jurisdictional grounds and defending the norm of prosecutorial discretion).
7. See Complaint, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00254, 2014 WL 6806231 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 3, 2014); Press Release, Attorney General of Texas Ken Paxton, Attorney General Ken Paxton
Announces Majority of States Now Part of Immigration Lawsuit; Tennessee, Nevada Officially Join
(Jan 26, 2015), available at https://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php?id=4936.
8. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV.
781 (2013).
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law scholars have argued that Obama administration is merely exercising
prosecutorial discretion and that there are many examples of previous
presidents taking similar actions.9 They argue that limited enforcement
resources and the need to address humanitarian concerns in individual
cases require such discretion and that such discretion is routinely exercised
by law enforcement agencies.
Both sides of this debate fail to account for the variety of actions that
the Obama administration has undertaken without obtaining Congressional
approval and the different legal issues that arise with each type. Because
backers of executive action have focused on precedents from previous
administrations, their arguments imply that there is nothing substantively
new about President Obama's actions. By contrast, claims that the
president is refusing to enforce the law fail to address the reality that
executive agencies routinely decide not to enforce laws rigidly in every
possible case. As a result, the legal debate about the scope of the
president's authority to change immigration policy has not fully
recognized what is actually innovative about the Obama policies, and it
has not focused with precision on those areas where the president is acting
within well-established authority and those areas where he has taken
executive discretion into uncharted territory.
This Commentary aims to add new focus to the debate about
President Obama's executive actions by defining five different types of
presidential discretion: Congressionally authorized discretion, discretion to
not enforce the statute in every case, discretion to authorize employment,
publicizing nonenforcement policies, and establishing categorical criteria
for deferred action. Table 1 summarizes this typology, with examples of
each.
9. See Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief, 1956-Present, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL 1 (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/executive grants
of temporary immigrationrelief_ 1956-present final_5.pdf ("[H]istory books reveal[] that President
Obama's action follows a long line of presidents who relied on their executive branch authority to
address immigration challenges."); Stephen H. Legomsky, Legal Authorities for DACA and Similar
Programs (Aug. 24, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/
2014/1ll/17/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/executive%20action%201egal%20points.pdf; Tanya Somanader,
Here 's What the President is Doing to Fix Our Broken Immigration System, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Nov. 20, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/20/here-s-what-president-doing-
fix-our-broken-immigration-system ("Every U.S. president since President Eisenhower has used his
executive authority to address immigration issues.").
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TABLE 1:
TAXONOMY OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION ON
IMMIGRATION IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
(SELECTIVE EXAMPLES)
TYPE I: Congressionally authorized discretion
* discretion authorized by statute for narrowly defined categories
such as asylees, victims of crime with minor marijuana offenses,
children of domestic violence victims
* expanded waiver eligibility for certain grounds of inadmissibility
TYPE II: Discretion to not enforce the statute in every case
* Morton Memo factors (2011-November 20, 2014)
* Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities (Nov. 20, 2014-)1o
o Priority 1: migrants caught at the border, criminal street
gang members, convicted felons under state law,
convicted aggravated felons under federal law, suspected
terrorists
o Priority 2: noncitizens convicted of three or more
misdemeanors or "significant misdemeanors" as defined
by Department of Homeland Security (among others)
o Priority 3: other noncitizens issued a removal order after
Jan. 1, 2014
TYPE III: Discretion to authorize employment
* beneficiaries of deferred action on an individual basis
* DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) (2012-2014 two
year employment authorization; beginning 2015 expanded criteria
with three-year employment authorization)
* DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents) (beginning 2015, with promised three-year
employment authorization)
10. See infranote 55.
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TYPE IV: Publicizing nonenforcement policies
* release of Morton Memos (2011)"
* Presidential Remarks on Immigration (DACA announcement)
(2012)
* presidential statements on new immigration actions (November
2014)
* Department of Homeland Security websites describing
enforcement and deferred action policies, such as:
o http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action
o http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca
TYPE V: Establishing categorical criteria for deferred action
* DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals)
* DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents)
The Commentary summarizes the distinct legal issues that arise with
each type of discretion. I have organized them as a continuum of legality
with Type I and Type II having well-established legal foundations. The
types at the other end of the spectrum, especially Type V, raise important
separation of powers questions because they may be construed as a form
of legislative rulemaking that conflicts with the terms of the INA. To be
clear, I argue no more than that these types of executive action raise
important questions about the extent of executive authority. I do not
actually argue that they go beyond the president's constitutional powers,
and I suspect that as implemented so far they are, in fact, permissible. But
I leave that question for another day. In this essay I suggest simply that the
debate over President Obama's immigration actions should be more
narrowly focused on these types of programs.
This continuum is depicted in Table 2.
11. Morton Memos, supra note 3.
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TABLE 2:
CONTINUUM OF LEGALITY FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF
IMMIGRATION DISCRETION
CLEARLY WITHIN
EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY
TYPE I:
discretion
Congression
TYPE II: Discretion to
statute in every case
TYPE III:
employment
TYPE IV:
policies
Discretion
ally authorized
not enforce the
to authorize
Publicizing nonenforcement
TYPE V: Establishing categorical criteria
for deferred action
LESS DEFINED OR
QUESTIONABLE
AUTHORITY
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TYPE 1: CONGRESSIONALLY AUTHORIZED DISCRETION
There are many parts of immigration law where the INA authorizes an
executive agency to exercise discretion in order to carry out statutory
mandates.' 2 Congress has in fact authorized deferred action by name in
specific situations.' 3 The Obama administration has used such provisions
to liberalize immigration laws in certain ways. For example, the INA
imposes three- and ten-year bars on readmission of noncitizens who were
previously unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180 days
or more than a year, respectively.1 4 But under the statute, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) has discretion to waive the bar in certain
cases where it would impose a particular kind of hardship." In 2012, DHS
issued new rules allowing noncitizens to apply to these waivers while still
unlawfully present in the country, preventing applicants from becoming
trapped abroad when their applications are denied, while also in effect
making it somewhat easier for certain unauthorized immigrants to obtain a
* 6
visa.
Because these exercises of discretion are authorized by statute, there is
little controversy about such decisions being within the powers of the
executive. But some have made a more ambitious argument that these
statutory authorizations to use discretion and explicit references to
deferred action legitimize broader discretionary authority for the
executive.' 7 This strikes me as a difficult argument to sustain. The narrow
specificity of these statutory provisions indicates that Congress did not
want to authorize broader discretion." By comparison, Canada's
immigration statute explicitly gives the minister broad authorization to
12. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (providing that the Attorney General may "in his
discretion" waive inadmissibility for noncitizens convicted of a single offense of marijuana
possession); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a) (providing that the Attorney General "may permit" voluntary
departure for certain deportable aliens). Many roles assigned in the statute were re-delegated to DHS
by subsequent legislation. See infra note 38, and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i) (prescribing a child of a domestic violence victims "is
eligible for deferred action and work authorization").
14. 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(ll).
15. 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(9)(B)(v).
16. See generally Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain
Immediate Relatives, 77 Fed. Reg. 19901 (Apr. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103).
17. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 9 (arguing that Congress' acknowledgement of the existence
of deferred action shows the legality of prosecutorial discretion).
18. Cf Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
Vexing Case(s) ofDREAMAct Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 463, 478 (2012) (explaining
how Congress has reduced the zones of authorized discretion in the INA since the 1970s).
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allow any immigrant to remain in the country.1 9 The American
immigration statute does not contain any such explicit grant of broad
discretionary authority.
TYPE II: DISCRETION TO NOT ENFORCE THE STATUTE IN EVERY CASE
When the executive branch decides not to attempt to deport a
noncitizen who is technically present in violation of the INA, the
executive must rely on its implicit authority to exercise prosecutorial
discretion. The most obvious form of prosecutorial discretion is the
decision not to prosecute at all, and it is not unique to immigration law.
Police do this as well as prosecutors when they decide not to arrest or cite
people whom they know are technically in violation of the law. For
example, most people believe that traffic police will not normally pull
drivers over for driving just barely over the speed limit.2 0 A common
justification for nonenforcement is that law enforcement agencies have
limited resources and must prioritize their work.
Although the Obama administration has brought new attention to
deferred action policies, previous research has documented that such
measures in the field of immigration date back at least to the Nixon
administration. 21 Although limited resources are often given as a rationale
for prioritizing enforcement against some people and not others,
nonenforcement is also justified by more subjective value judgments.
There are equitable concerns in individual cases where rigid enforcement
of the law might seem harsh or cruel.22 There are also situations where law
enforcement agencies may decide that statutes still on the books are out of
step with new social mores, even if the legislature has not repealed the
measure.23
19. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 25.1-2 (Can.). See also Maria
A. Fufidio, "You May Say I'm A Dreamer, But I'm Not the Only One": Categorical Prosecutorial
Discretion and Its Consequences for US Immigration Law, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 976, 1000 (2013).
20. See, e.g., Philip Reed, Top 5 Ways to Get Pulled Over by the Cops, EDMUNDS.COM (Oct. 6,
2011), http://www.edmunds.com/driving-tips/top-5-ways-to-get-pulled-over-by-the-cops.htmi.
21. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010).
22. See id. at 244-245 (observing that prosecutorial discretion is typically justified by both
resource and humanitarian concerns).
23. For instance, even before Lawrence v. Texas, it was actually quite rare for consenting adults
to be prosecuted under sodomy laws that were still on the books in many states. See generally DALE
CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012). A similar practice
may exist in some localities where police and prosecutors decide not to penalize people for low-level
marijuana usage, even if it is technically still a crime.
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Nonenforcement discretion has received broad endorsement by the
Supreme Court in the context of administrative law, and specifically in the
context of immigration law. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court found that a
decision by an agency to not enforce a particular law in a particular case is
"presumptively unreviewable."2 4 In the immigration context, the Court
found in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee that the
executive has wide discretion to decide whether to initiate or continue
deportation proceedings "for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own
convenience." 2 5 In 2012, the Court issued its ruling on Arizona's anti-
immigrant SB 1070 bill shortly after President Obama announced the
DACA program. The Arizona majority reiterated that "broad discretion" is
a "principal feature" of the immigration system. 26
The Arizona Court expanded on the necessity for federal officials to
use discretion as part of its explanation for why states should not be able
to interfere in federal prerogatives about how immigration laws should be
enforced:
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces
immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support
their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien
smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an
individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the
alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the
community, or a record of distinguished military service.2 7
These considerations endorsed by the Arizona Court provide authority for
the executive to defer enforcement based on equitable factors, not only
because of limited resources. 28 The factors endorsed in Arizona also
broadly mirror the factors listed as considerations for deferred action in the
Morton Memos.29
24 Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
25. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S 471, 484 (1999).
26. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
27. Id.
28 In a dissent in the Arizona decision which was issued by the Supreme Court just a few weeks
later, Justice Scalia argues that limited resources cannot fully explain the DACA program because the
government requires resources to process applications for the program. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521-22
(J. Scalia, dissenting). But applicants are required to pay a filing fee of $380 to U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services to process their applications, plus $85 for biometric security screening. See
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca#
filing%20process (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
29. Compare Morton Memos, supra note 3.
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Even critics of the Obama policies concede that the president has some
discretionary authority to prioritize enforcement of the law against some
people and choose nonenforcement with others.30 But these judicial
precedents appear to speak only to the simple decision to refrain from
taking enforcement action. They do not appear on their texts to deal with
more affirmative actions, nor to the kinds of categorical rules and
application procedures that the Obama administration has put into effect.
Nonenforcement is the absence of an action; it involves the government
simply deciding not to enforce the law against a certain person. In a strict
sense, simple nonenforcement does not even require the knowledge of the
beneficiary.
Deferred action in immigration typically includes something more
affirmative: the Notice of Action that is sent to beneficiaries states that the
Department of Homeland Security "has decided to defer action in your
case," which is analogous to a prosecutor telling a suspect that she has
decided not to press charges at the present time.31 The deferred action
notice indicates that the decision remains in place "unless terminated." 32
Thus, DACA grants a reprieve, but not a visa. But because the law
enforcement agency informs the beneficiary of the decision, deferred
action is conceptually distinct from many other forms of prosecutorial
discretion. But this distinction does not mean that deferred action goes
beyond the normal patterns of prosecutorial discretion. Traffic police who
choose not to pull over every speeder they see do not tell most of the
violators that they have been allowed a free pass. But police do sometimes
let violators go with just a warning, and prosecutors do sometimes tell
potential defendants that the state will not press charges even if legally it
could sustain a prosecution.
TYPE III: DISCRETION TO AUTHORIZE EMPLOYMENT
Under DACA, deferred action notices come with the promise that "an
Employment Authorization Document (EAD) will arrive separately in the
mail." 3 3 This EAD, a credit card-sized identification document, affords the
right to obtain a Social Security number. 34 In many states, an EAD can be
30. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 792-94 .
31. See Dep't of Homeland Security 1-797 Notice of Action in a deferred action case handled by
the Thomas & Mack Legal Clinic (on file with author).
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note
28.
34. See RM 10211.420 Employment Authorization for Non-Immigrants, SOCIAL SECURITY
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the basis for obtaining a driver's license or even facilitate professional
licensure. 35 While simple nonenforcement of immigration law has a clear
analogy to prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context, prosecutors do
not actually issue permits to let people continue to engage in unlawful
activity. While nonenforcement of the law leaves people essentially as
they were, the grant of employment authorization leaves them
substantially better off. Thus, on the surface it appears that the Obama
administration is granting significant immigration benefits to people who,
according to statute, are ineligible to even enter the country. 3 6 In the words
of one Republican senator: "I can understand he can prioritize prosecution
and deportation, and he has, but where does the president get the authority
to issue work permits for millions of people?" 37
The answer is that Congress gave the executive branch this authority, at
least implicitly. The INA defines the categories of noncitizens who are
authorized to be employed differently than the categories of those who are
permitted to be in the country. The statute defines a noncitizen who is not
authorized to work as an "alien [who] is not at that time either an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or authorized to be so
employed by this chapter or by the [Department ofHomeland Security]."
Thus, the statute implicitly envisions that some noncitizens who are not
authorized to work by the statute may be so authorized by the executive.
The regulations that implement this section provide that employment
authorization may be granted to noncitizens who benefit from deferred
action.39 Thus, the executive branch has the authority to affirmatively
grant employment authorization because Congress has allowed it to do
SO40so. 4
ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2014), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsflnx/01 10211420.
35. See Access to Driver's Licenses, NAT'L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (last visited Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.nilc.org/driverlicenses.html.
36. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining classes ofexcludable noncitizens).
37. Cindy Same, GOP Vows to Counter Obama on Immigration, VOICE OF AMERICA (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.voanews.com/content/rcpublicans-obama-immigration-reform/2528477.html
(quoting Sen. John Cornyn of Texas).
38. 8 U.S.C § 1324a(h)(3) (emphasis added). The text of the statute refers to authorization "by
the Attorney General," who previously supervised the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
When the INS was abolished in 2002, Congress transferred these functions to the Department of
Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. § 1103. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) ("It is unlawful for a person or
other entity to hire . . . for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an
unauthorized alien (as defined in subsection (h)(3) of this section).").
39 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(a)(11) (2014); 8 C.F.R § 274a.12(c)(14).
40. The lack of strict statutory regulation about which noncitizens may legally work is consistent
with the overall policy orientation of the INA. Congress opted to focus deterrence of illegal
employment of immigrants against employers, not the immigrants themselves. See Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). While the statute prohibits employers from
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In the context of the taxonomy that I am presenting here, there would
be reasonable grounds to consider the authorization of employment a
variety of Type I discretion, given that it is authorized by statute. But I
have categorized it separately because the statute is less explicit about
employment authorization than it is about other specific exercises of
discretion. The statute clearly envisions executive authority to authorize
employment in some cases, but it is not clear that Congress ever imagined
that this authority would be used to grant employment authorization to
large numbers of people who, according to the statute, should not be in the
country. Administrative law permits the executive to reasonably interpret
ambiguous statutes through regulations.4 1
The wide availability of employment authorization under the Obama
deferred action programs is within the explicit terms of the regulation.
Nevertheless, Congress did not authorize such programs with the clarity
through which it authorized other types of discretion, and it would be a
stretch to suggest that Congress meant to do so. In the type of discretion at
issue here, the executive is relying on the ambiguity of a statute rather than
on a clear delegation of power from Congress. Since there is a reasonable
argument to be made that the administration is going beyond
Congressional intentions, this type of discretion is on somewhat more
tenuous legal grounds than Type I.
TYPE IV: PUBLICIZING NONENFORCEMENT POLICIES
While nonenforcement discretion has been a part of immigration
policy for many decades, one of the Obama administration's most
important innovations in the area of immigration discretion has been its
decision to publish its nonenforcement policies. Previous administrations
had devoted considerable efforts to keeping their immigration enforcement
policies shielded from public scrutiny.42 Public knowledge that such
policies even existed came about through the high-profile deportation case
in the 1970s involving John Lennon and ensuing Freedom of Information
Act litigation by his attorney, Leon Wildes.4 3 In 2007, the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Ombudsman
hiring unauthorized workers, Congress chose not to explicitly prohibit or penalize unauthorized
immigrants for seeking or accepting employment, so long as they do not do so by fraud. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(a); Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006).
41. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
42. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458, 510-30 (2009) (showing that presidential discretion is usually not subject to public scrutiny).
43. See Wadhia, supra note 21, at 246-52.
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recommended publishing "basic information on deferred action,"
including criteria and instructions on how to apply, but the Bush-era
USCIS director declined, citing the discretionary and "case-by-case"
nature of the program.44
This approach rapidly changed after President Obama took office. In
June 2009, the Obama administration published a press release
announcing that it would grant deferred action to certain children and
45
spouses of deceased U.S. citizens. In 2011, the Morton Memos were
made available to the public.46 When the president initiated DACA, he
announced it in a televised speech in the White House Rose Garden.4 7 In
November 2014, the president's announcement of new executive actions
was accompanied by immediate publication of at least 12 memoranda and
additional fact sheets providing information about how the administration
would exercise discretion going forward.48 To be clear, it is not new that
immigration agencies have guidelines about how they should exercise
discretion. 49 Rather, what is new since 2009 is that federal immigration
agencies publicly announced and disseminated these guidelines.
There are good reasons to conclude that this new transparency may be
beneficial to democracy. Before she was on the Supreme Court, Elena
Kagan argued that presidents should use the power of regulatory agencies
to achieve policy goals because they can be subject to political
accountability through elections.50 But she noted that this political
accountability could only function if the president's politics are disclosed
to the public.51 From this perspective, the launch of the DACA program
was particularly laudable, because the president announced it in a Rose
Garden ceremony during an election year, debated it with his opponent,
and won re-election.
There is certainly room for objections. Disseminating such
information to the public may have the downside of eliminating any
deterrent effect that may come from leaving the public guessing about how
44 Id at 262-63.
45. Id at 263.
46. See Morton Memos, supra note 3.
47. Remarks by the President on Immigration, supra note 2.
48. See Fixing Our Broken Immigration System Through Executive Action-Key Facts, supra
note 1, and accompanying links.
49. Wadhia, supra note 21, at 246-52.
50. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2369 (2001).
51. Id. ("The President's involvement, at least if publicly disclosed, vests the action with an
increased dose of accountability, which although not (by definition) peculiarly legislative in nature,
renders the action less troublesome than solely bureaucratic measures from the standpoint of
democratic values.").
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the government decides whom to target for enforcement.5 2 Announcing
that the law will not be enforced against certain people might appear to be
a means for an executive to unilaterally rewrite the law. Nevertheless,
policy disagreements about whether to make discretion criteria public can
be resolved through the political process. If the president is within his
authority to decide not to rigidly enforce the law against every person, it is
difficult to see why he would be prohibited from informing the public how
he intends to use this discretion.
TYPE V: ESTABLISHING CATEGORICAL CRITERIA FOR DEFERRED ACTION
The Morton Memos set out a long list of factors favoring and
disfavoring enforcing immigration law in different cases, but they are
ambiguous about how these conflicting factors should be weighted in a
specific case. 5 3 The Morton Memos purport only to guide enforcement
priorities, and state that ICE officers "may exercise discretion."54 They do
not require it.5 5 But where the Morton Memos were open-ended, DACA's
criteria are specific and unambiguous. For DACA, USCIS set up a website
and application procedure that looks much like those that the agency has
established for visa programs that are authorized by statute.56 Various
sources have called this "class-based" or "categorical" discretion.5 7 This
seems to be the pattern that USCIS is likely to follow with the new
deferred action program for parents of U.S. citizen children and legal
residents.
DACA may represent the first time that federal immigration
authorities established a formal application procedure for a purely
52. Cf Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (makiig an exception for information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, if disclosure would increase the rate of law breaking by
revealing law enforcement strategies and guidelines).
53. See Morton Memos, supra note 3.
54. Id.
55. November 2014 revisions of the Morton Memos make this emphatic: see Memorandum from
Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., for Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting
Dir., U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, et al. 5 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120 memojirosecutorial discretion.pdf ("Nothing in this
memorandum should be construed to prohibit or discourage the apprehension, detention, or removal of
aliens unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as priorities herein.").
56. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DA CA), supra note 28.
57. See, e.g., The Dep't of Homeland Sec.'s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, slip op. O.L.C. at 15, 18, 20, 33 (Nov.
19, 2014) [hereinafter "OLC opinion"], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11 -19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf (referring to "class-
based deferred action" and to the "categorical variety" of deferred action).
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discretionary form of deferred action that has no specific statutory basis.
Because it involves clear criteria and a set procedure with little room for
case-by-case decision making, the DACA program appears to have "the
hallmarks of a statement of law."59 If DACA had been issued in order to
apply an ambiguous statutory provision, it probably would have required a
notice and comment process because it bears the characteristics of a
legislative rule under the Administrative Procedures Act. 60 In fact, some
have argued that deferred action policies should be enforceable in court,
on the theory that issuing detailed policy guidance strips these programs of
their discretionary character.
Matters of discretion are not typically subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act.6 2 But there is another important
distinction at the heart of DACA. Immigration agencies often issue
detailed rules governing the administration of a visa program that is
authorized by statute. 6 3 These situations often call for discretion-what I
have called Type I discretion-because it is explicitly required and
authorized by Congress. But what makes DACA distinctive is that it is not
based on any statutory provision at all.64 DACA's beneficiaries are people
who are inadmissible and/or deportable according to the explicit terms of
the statute.65 Thus, the strongest criticism of DACA is that by writing
categorical rules that benefit people who are excluded by statute, President
Obama is acting in defiance of the law rather than exercising discretion
about how to apply the law.66
The quasi-legislative character of the DACA rules does bring
prosecutorial discretion into uncharted constitutional territory. By
unilaterally establishing a new immigration program, complete with
58. See Mike Warley, Note, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Case of Prosecutorial
Discretion or Inappropriate Agency Rulemaking?, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 683, 685 (2012).
59. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 844-45.
60. See Warley, supra note 58, at 695-706.
61 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the
Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 57-63
(2013) (arguing that deferred action decisions may be judicially reviewable under the Administrative
Procedures Act). Cf Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of
Oscar Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR 437 (2013) (describing the failure to apply Morton Memo criteria in a
particular case).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
63. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (establishing rules to implement the U Visa).
64. Instead of a notice and comment process, when USCIS established an application procedure
for DACA, it published a "30-Day Notice of Information Collection Under Review" to solicit
comments on the proposed process. Comment Request, 77 Fed. Reg. 49451 (Aug. 16, 2012).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(6)(A) (an alien present without being admitted or paroled is
inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (an alien present in violation of the INA is deportable).
66. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 844-45.
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specific criteria and a formal application procedure, the Obama
administration has made Congressional action somewhat less necessary to
achieve its policy goals.67 Perhaps this is a power that the president has
always had. In Heckler, the Supreme Court suggested in a footnote that
there is some threshold at which an executive's exercise of discretion
becomes "so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities." 6 8 The Court has also warned that presidential power is
"at its lowest ebb" if the executive takes actions that are "incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress." 6 9 The trouble is that we
do not know where or how to draw the line between nonenforcement that
is a natural consequence of prosecutorial discretion and nonenforcement
that is so prescribed that it amounts to an executive rewriting of the law.
The seriousness of these concerns is illustrated by the Office of Legal
Counsel's (OLC) review of the November 2014 executive actions.70 OLC
signaled that "class-based" deferred action programs posed a particular
problem unless they incorporate an individualized, case-by-case review
with room to deviate from general rules in individual cases.' OLC
blocked a proposed deferred action program for parents of DACA
recipients, while permitting one for parents of U.S. citizens, on the theory
that Congress has in the past shown an inclination to approve interim
deferred action for noncitizens who will eventually become eligible for a
visa. 72 Under current law, U.S. citizens can sponsor their parents once they
turn 21; by contrast, DACA recipients have no legal right to remain the
country and cannot sponsor another person. However, this attempt to
draw a limit on deferred action is subject to at least two major objections.
First, a program is not authorized by Congress because previous
Congresses have authorized similar programs.74 Second, not all
67. Cf OLC opinion, supra note 57, at 6 ("[T]he Executive cannot, under the guise of exercising
enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences.").
68. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
69. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (J. Jackson, concurring).
70. OLC opinion, supra note 57.
71. Id. atl8n.8,22-23.
72. Id. at 29, 32.
73. Id. Compare Steve Legomsky, Why Can't Deferred Action Be Given to Parents of the
Dreamers?, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014) http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/l I/why-cant-deferred-
action-be-given-to.html (arguing that DACA and deferred action for parents of DACA recipients can
be justified on humanitarian grounds).
74. Cf Adam Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, Executive Discretion and Congressional Priorities,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 21, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/executive-discretion-and-
congressional.html (commending in part OLC's search for implicit Congressional priorities, but
casting doubt on whether such priorities can be clearly discerned from the INA).
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beneficiaries of Obama's deferred action programs will ever be eligible for
visas under current law.75 Most DACA beneficiaries never will. 7 6
The strained reasoning by which OLC justified DACA and newly
expanded deferred action should be a warning for advocates of such
policies. Executive discretion cannot be limitless. Some line must be
drawn, even if OLC did not draw the line coherently.77 The central defense
of President Obama's actions has been that the executive has inherent
authority to use discretion to reflect resource and humanitarian realities.
But these rationales apply more easily to simple nonenforcement. By
contrast, specifically defining beneficiaries and establishing an application
procedure create more danger of the executive usurping the role of the
legislature. This is the type of discretion that deserves the most focused
debate.
CONCLUSION
By one view, DACA is an illegal action, signaled by the fact that OLC
could not articulate a coherent rationale for its existence. But it is also
possible that OLC was overly cautious. It may be that the Obama
immigration actions are all defensible simply because they grant such
tenuous rights, if that is even the right word. At their core, they simply
provide an unenforceable promise not to deport. It is also important to
note that the Administration can make a strong case that it has enforced
immigration law energetically, deporting record numbers of noncitizens.79
Thus, President Obama cannot be seriously accused of abdicating
responsibility to enforce immigration law.80 Moreover, many aspects of
75. See also OLC opinion, supra note 57, at 19 n.14.
76. See Ahilan Arulanantham, Two Rationales for Administrative Relief BALKINIZATION (Nov.
21, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/l1/two-rationales-for-administrative-relief.html (noting
that the OLC rationale seems to cast doubt on DACA itself); David A. Martin, Concerns About a
Troubling Presidential Precedent and OLC s Review of Its Validity, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014)
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11 /concems-about-troubling-presidential.html (same).
77. See Martin, supra note 76 ("It's almost as though OLC felt it had to draw a line in the legal
sand somewhere or else there would be no end to the pressures on the executive branch to add new
groups to the deferred action list.").
78. Cf Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(affirming, under the theory of plenary power, the government's decision to revoke a promise to re-
admit a Chinese person who had left the country expecting to be able to return).
79. See JOHN F. SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 6 Fig. 2 (Sept. 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/oisenforcement ar2013.pdf.
80. Cf David. A. Martin, A Lawful Step for the Immigration System, WASH. POST (June 24,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-lawful-step-for-the-immigration-system/2012/06/
2015] 1099
1100 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1083
Obama's executive actions on immigration law stand on solid legal
foundations. But President Obama has done some things that are new,
particularly in terms of announcing his prosecutorial discretion policies,
and in establishing specific eligibility criteria and a formal application
process. These measures take discretion into uncharted constitutional
territory, and these are the areas on which the debate about the legality of
the president's executive actions on immigration should be focused.
24/gJQAgTOOOV story.html (arguing that the President must maintain a high level of immigration
enforcement because Congress has appropriated funds to do so).
